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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that Congress adopted in 
1925 bears little resemblance to the Act as the Supreme Court of the 
United States has construed it.  The original Act was intended to pro-
vide federal courts with procedural law that would permit the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements between merchants in diversity 
cases.
1
  The Supreme Court’s construction of the statute, especially in 
the last twenty-five years, amounts to a judicially created legislative 
program, imposed without congressional input, that has vastly ex-
panded the reach and focus of the original statute.  As construed by 
the Supreme Court, the statute now permits arbitration of statutory 
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 1 The 1924 House Report provided, for example: 
Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a 
question of procedure to be determined by the law court in which the 
proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law to be determined 
by the law of the forum in which the contract is made. Before such 
contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is 
essential.  
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: 
Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th 
Cong. 5–10 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (describing the purpose of FAA as to 
provide an inexpensive way to resolve disputes of merchants or of anyone engaged in 
buying and selling); id. at 31 (statement of Thomas B. Paton, American Bankers’ As-
sociation) (presenting ABA resolution of support, citing, in part, that “all merchants 
doing interstate and foreign business seek a method whereby disputes arising in their 
daily business transactions can be speedily, economically, and equitably disposed 
of”); infra text accompanying notes 134–153.  See generally Paul D. Carrington & Paul 
H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (discussing Supreme 
Court arbitration jurisprudence); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How 
the Supreme Court Created A Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 99 (2006) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s tendency to expand the scope 
of the FAA).  
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claims,
2
 as well as arbitration under adhesion contracts where the 
weaker party has not given actual consent to arbitrate.
3
  Moreover, al-
though workers were specifically excluded from the coverage of the 
original act,
4
 the Court’s construction of the statute permits employ-
ers to impose arbitration on employees.
5
  The Court has also con-
strued the statute to preempt state contract law that attempts to pro-
tect citizens from the abuses of arbitration.
6
  These are major 




The Court’s construction of the FAA has had substantial conse-
quences for our legal system.  Taken together, the Courts’ arbitration 
opinions reflect policies similar to those in vogue in the early twen-
tieth century, favoring big business over consumers and employees 
while showing antipathy to state and federal laws and regulations pro-
tecting rights of individuals and small businesses.
8
  These policy deci-
 
 2  See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Ro-
driguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989); Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985). 
 3 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–69 (1995); Gilmer, 
500 U.S. at 23.  See generally Jean Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just? 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); David Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How 
“Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration,” 8 NEV. L.J. 400 (2007). 
 4 See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Com-
mercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the Com-
mittee of Commerce, Trade and Commercial  Law of the American Bar Association) 
(explaining that the statute was not intended to cover workers); see also Moses, supra 
note 1, at 105–06 (discussing a letter from Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Com-
merce, to Congress emphasizing that the legislation did not and should not apply to 
workers). 
 5 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
 6 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).  For other cas-
es holding that the FAA preempts state law, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); see also David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism 
Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 54 (“Southland and its progeny are 
the result of bad statutory interpretation and even worse federalism. The historical 
evidence demonstrates that Congress never intended to preempt state law regulating 
arbitration agreements.”). 
 7 See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 402 (“[I]f the FAA had been pre-
sented to Congress, as legislation having the effects ascribed to them by the Court, [it 
would not] have been assured of a single vote of approval.”). 
 8 See Moses, supra note 1, at 158 (“[T]he Court has used various statutory inter-
pretation techniques to reduce the protections legislated in the fields of federal anti-
trust, securities, and employment law and has intruded upon state police powers to 
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sions need to be carefully examined by today’s Congress, which 
should not relinquish to the Court the right to legislate about arbitra-
tion or to determine arbitration policy.  Congress has an obligation to 
ensure that legislation it has enacted serves the interest of its consti-
tuents, and does not become, through judicial construction, entirely 
different legislation that does not support and may even contradict 
the original statute that Congress enacted.
9
 
One of the major paradigm shifts in arbitration has arisen out of 
the Supreme Court’s decision to permit arbitration of statutory 
claims.
10
  Arbitration of statutory claims was not a purpose of the 1925 
Act, which Congress adopted to permit enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in federal court for contract claims between merchants.
11
  
Moreover, statutory claims simply are not as well protected in an arbi-
tration process as in a judicial process.
12
  As will be discussed below, 
arbitration does not provide the same level of discovery or the same 
procedural rights as litigation, nor does it provide for meaningful 
judicial review.
13
  Thus, when disputes over matters affecting civil 
 
prevent states from enforcing legislation designed to protect their citizens against an 
unfair or unreasonable imposition of arbitration.”).  
 9 There are currently some bills before Congress that, if adopted, would elimi-
nate pre-dispute arbitration in certain areas, such as in consumer purchases, em-
ployment contracts, and nursing home contracts.  See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, S. 931, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration 
Act of 2009, S. 512, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. (2009); Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, 
H.R. 991, 111th Cong. (2009).  These bills do not, however, address issues such as 
the broad preemption of state contract law by the FAA; the Court’s delegation of 
power to decide claims under mandatory laws to citizen-arbitrators, whose awards are 
not subject to judicial review on the merits; the Court’s judicially created policy of 
favoring arbitration over litigation; or the elimination of any possibility of judicial 
review in accordance with party agreement.  
 10 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616 
(1985) (requiring arbitration in Japan of U.S. antitrust claims raised by car dealer-
ship); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“It is 
by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, 
enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 534 
(1974) (holding that claims under the Securities Act of 1934 were arbitrable). 
 11 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 5–10. 
 12 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am. Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1955). 
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury . . . .  Arbitrators do not have 
the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their 
reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as com-
plete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more li-
mited than judicial review of a trial . . . . 
Id. 
 13 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 649 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The factfinding 
process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. . . . [T]he usual 
rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, 
such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, 
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rights, securities regulations, consumer protection, or antitrust law 
arise, if an arbitrator gets it wrong on the law, there is no recourse for 
the aggrieved party.  The grounds provided for review of an award 
under the FAA do not permit a court to review the award on the me-
rits, but only allow review as to matters of fairness and arbitrator mis-
conduct. The risk of having statutory claims decided by arbitrators is 
that the careful protections Congress included in these statutes will 
be undermined if parties are not allowed sufficient discovery and if 
there is no possibility for review on points of law.
14
  Yet Congress has 
not focused on how this Supreme Court policy of moving statutory 
claims into arbitration impacts these legislative protections. 
Deferring to the courts is unreasonable when the courts are in-
terpreting the FAA in a manner inconsistent with both the text and 
the purpose of the statute.
15
  Moreover, when the Supreme Court fol-
lows its own path, instead of construing the statute consistent with the 




are often severely limited or unavailable.”) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974)). 
 14 According to Professor Stephen Ware, lack of any review of an arbitration 
award by a court for an error of law means that the law has been “privatized” in the 
sense that parties who arbitrate have contracted out of the law because they have 
consented to the arbitration award regardless of whether it was correct on the law.  
Stephen Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 
83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711–12 (1999).  Thus, arbitration of a claim arising under a 
mandatory law, such as antitrust, essentially permits parties to contract out of the law, 
rendering the law a default provision rather than a mandatory one.  Id. at 705–07.  
Professor Ware argues that claims under mandatory rules should either be found to 
be inarbitrable, or, because mandatory rules trump freedom of contract, courts 
should review for errors of law any awards based on claims under mandatory rules.  
Id. at 733–39. 
 15 See, e.g., Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(describing the decision as “unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and . . . 
inexplicable.  [It is an] exercise in judicial revisionism [that] goes too far. “); see also 
Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674 (1996) (arguing that the Court’s 
FAA jurisprudence is inconsistent with the legislative history and that “the Court’s 
preference for arbitration over litigation, its conclusion that the FAA preempts all 
protective state legislation, and its assurance that arbitration is just as fair a forum as 
litigation for resolution of legal complaints are myths that the Court has expounded 
since 1983”). 
 16  See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 99 (2005) (“[I]nterpretation of a statute 
that tends to implement the legislator’s will helps to implement the public’s will and 
is therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose. . . . 
[I]nterpretation that undercuts the statute’s objectives tends to undercut that consti-
tutional objective.”); Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons 
from Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 962 
(2007) (“[A]n overt effort to substitute an interpreter’s sense of what the statute 
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The Court’s refusal to cooperate with the legislative commands of the 
FAA is evident in the Court’s interpretive methodology in the case of 
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
17
 and in its earlier decision 
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
18
 
This Article focuses on these two decisions in order to bring to-
gether several concerns about arbitration law.  First, the Supreme 
Court has construed the FAA in a way that either undervalues or ig-
nores both the text and the legislative history, and therefore Con-
gress’s statutory commands; this is demonstrated most recently by the 
Court’s decision in Hall Street.  Moreover, the Court’s construction of 
the FAA, particularly in its decision in Mitsubishi that mandatory rules 
of law can be arbitrated, has undercut the protections Congress has 
adopted in the areas of civil rights, securities, consumer protection, 
antitrust, and employment.  Arbitrators’ rulings on mandatory rules 
of law have been largely unreviewable on the merits, and after Hall 
Street, appear absolutely unreviewable on the merits.  The Court’s re-
sult-oriented methodology has developed arbitration law in a direc-
tion unanticipated by the text or legislative history of the statute.  The 
determination that arbitrator-citizens can enforce—or not enforce—
Congress’s regulatory laws without judicial review should prompt 
Congress to take a close look at how arbitration law is impacting not 
only individuals but also the entire justice system. 
In both Hall Street and Mitsubishi, the Court had to interpret the 
FAA with respect to a situation about which the statute was silent; 
there was simply no statutory language that was plainly applicable.
19
  
In Hall Street, the question was whether the parties’ agreement to 
have their award reviewed by a court for errors of fact or law was en-
forceable under the FAA.
20
  Resolving a split in the federal circuit 
courts, the Supreme Court held that parties cannot contract around 
the narrow grounds provided in the FAA for confirming, vacating, or 
modifying an arbitration award.
21
  According to the Court, the statu-
tory grounds are mandatory and exclusive.
22
  The Court thus resolved 
the conflict by determining that in the absence of text dealing specif-
 
ought to mean for the meaning that the legislature intended to convey is an uncons-
titutional exercise of legislative power . . . .”). 
 17 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). 
 18 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 19 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403–04; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 623–29. 
 20 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400. 
 21 Id. at 1404. 
 22 Id. 
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ically with the situation, the FAA prohibited access to the courts for 
expanded judicial review, even though agreed to by the parties.
23
 
In Hall Street, the Court focused primarily on the text of the FAA, 
holding that because the text did not specifically provide for judicial 
review based on party agreement, no such review was allowed.
24
  In 
Mitsubishi, by contrast, the Court interpreted the silence of the statute 
to reach a very different conclusion.  In that case, the Court found 
that because the text of the FAA said nothing about statutory claims, 
a presumption existed in favor of such claims.
25
  In doing so, the 
Court vastly expanded the scope of the FAA by holding that antitrust 
claims were arbitrable.
26
  As will be discussed below, in both cases, the 
decisions do not seriously engage the text or the legislative history 
and thus suggest that the Court has created its own arbitration law, 
independent of the history, purpose, or text of the statute that Con-
gress enacted. 
Taken together, the two cases show the Supreme Court moving 
arbitration law in a direction not only against the purposes of the 
FAA, but also against the interests of those individuals that Congress 
intended to protect by adopting laws to prevent abuses of civil rights, 
consumer rights, monopolies, and securities fraud.  As many com-
mentators and courts have noted, rights may not be as well protected 
in arbitration as in court.
27
  Nonetheless, the Court has not only ex-
panded the scope of the FAA to make claims under such statutes ar-
bitrable, but also, in Hall Street, has narrowed defenses to enforce-
ment of awards under those statutes.
28
  As will be discussed below, in 
Hall Street, the Court not only denied parties the right to seek court 
review of the merits of an arbitrator’s award, but also eliminated the 
safety valve used by some courts when arbitrators made egregious er-
 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. at 1404–05. 
 25 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 623–29 
(1985). 
 26 See id. at 628–29. 
 27 See, e.g., id. at 649 n.14; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 
203 (1955); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Preju-
dice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (arguing that infor-
mal processes increase the risk of class-based discrimination); Elizabeth A. Roma, 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts and the Need for Meaningful Judicial 
Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 520 (2004) (“Unfortunately, the very 
features that attract parties to ADR undermine the protection of an individual’s sta-
tutory rights.  Because ADR is less formal and is not held to the same standards as 
judicial proceedings, there is a risk that laws may be misapplied, or not applied at all, 
and that justice will be exchanged for efficiency.”). 
 28 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404–05 (2008). 
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rors of law, i.e., the vacatur of an arbitral award on the grounds of 
manifest disregard of the law.
29
  This elimination of all possible judi-
cial review for errors of law, combined with the large scale delegation 
to private citizen-arbitrators to make decisions on the law that are 
confidential and unreviewable on the merits, has vastly changed the 
landscape of the justice system.  Congressional action is needed. 
In Part II, this Article will consider the Court’s decision in Hall 
Street that the text of the FAA does not permit expanded judicial re-
view.  Part III will focus on a comparison with the Court’s very differ-
ent interpretive approach to the statutory text in Mitsubishi, when it 
expanded the scope of the FAA to reach statutory claims.  The com-
parison of the two cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court has 
applied its interpretive methodology in ways that minimize, if not 
eliminate, its obligation to construe the FAA in a manner consistent 
with the text and purpose of the statute.  Finally, Part IV will consider 
the negative impact of these two cases on regulatory laws adopted by 
Congress and will discuss the need for Congress to take back legisla-
tive control of arbitration policy.  It will then propose some alterna-
tives that Congress should consider for dealing with the arbitration of 
statutory claims. 
II. HALL STREET AND EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. The Background of Expanded Judicial Review 
The underlying problem prompting some parties to agree to 
seek expanded judicial review of arbitral awards was the fear that a 
maverick arbitrator might render an award that was unquestionably 
wrong yet could not be vacated.
30
  The narrow grounds specifically set 
forth in the FAA for vacating or modifying an award permit judicial 
review only for reasons that go to the integrity of the process, such as 
if a party was not permitted to present its case, if the arbitrator ex-
ceeded his powers, or if there was fraud or corruption.
31
  The statute 
does not provide for review based on an arbitrator’s error of law or 
fact. 
 
 29 Id.; see also infra note 122. 
 30 For examples of parties’ concerns about irrational awards, see Christopher 
Drahozal, Standards for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States: Mandatory 
Rules or Default Rules?, 16-9 MEALEY’S INT’L. ARB. REP. 27, 28 (2001); Stephen A. 
Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Error – An Option to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 103, 104 (1997); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 248–53 (1999). 
 31 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).  
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Arbitration is a creature of consent; therefore, a few parties who 
had concerns about arbitrator errors that could not otherwise be re-
medied began drafting arbitration clauses in which they agreed that 
the arbitrator’s award would be subject to judicial review on the me-
rits.
32
 A number of circuit courts enforced these agreements.
33
  These 
courts emphasized freedom of contract, reasoning that under the 
FAA, the specific terms of the parties’ private agreement to arbitrate 
must be enforced.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted, “Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coer-
cion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
agreements as they see fit.”34  Thus, courts supporting expanded judi-
cial review found that the FAA grounds were default provisions and 
that parties could draft around them.
35
  In addition, these courts also 
took note that “enforcing the arbitration agreement—even with en-
hanced judicial review—will consume far fewer judicial resources 
than if the case were given plenary adjudication.”36 
Moreover, these courts believed that enforcing agreements for 
expanded judicial review served an important policy under the FAA, 
which was that courts should enforce an arbitration agreement ac-
cording to its terms.
37
  In other words, these courts reinforced the vo-
luntary consensual underpinning of arbitration.  This was consistent 
with the widespread view that arbitration offered the important ad-
 
 32 Only a small number of parties appear to have actually entered into agree-
ments for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.  See Reply Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 18, Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 
06-989) (“[A]lthough the Fifth Circuit has permitted expanded judicial review provi-
sions since 1995, Hall Street has been able to identify only three written district court 
decisions from that circuit in which a court applied such a provision in reviewing an 
arbitration award.”) (footnote omitted). 
 33 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403 n.5 (“The First, Third, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, 
meanwhile, have held that parties may so contract. . . . The Fourth Circuit has taken 
[this] side of the [circuit] split in an unpublished opinion . . . .”) (citing P.R. Tel. Co. 
v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. 
Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005); Roadway Package Sys., 
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 
F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 
997 (5th Cir. 1995)).   
 34 Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)). 
 35 See sources cited supra note 33. 
 36 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Ko-
zinski, J., concurring), vacated sub nom., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade 
Servs., Inc. 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 37 See id. at 888 (majority opinion) (“[T]he primary purpose of the FAA is to en-
sure enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with the agree-
ments’ terms”). 
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Other courts, however, refused to enforce party agreements for 
judicial review of an award on the merits.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits concluded that the narrow grounds 
set forth in the FAA are mandatory and exclusive, and that a party-
determined expansion of judicial review was impermissible and con-
flicted with the policies of the FAA.
39
  Those policies, according to the 
Tenth Circuit, supported the independence of arbitration from inter-
ference by the court.
40
  The two circuit courts also found that parties 
have no power to go beyond the statute and to require additional re-
view by the court.
41
  The Ninth Circuit noted, for example: 
“[B]ecause Congress has specified standards for confirming an arbi-
tration award, federal courts must act pursuant to those standards 
and not others. . . . [P]rivate parties lack the power to dictate how the 
federal courts conduct the business of resolving disputes.”42 
The differences between the two positions were stark.  The first 
position was that party agreements for judicial review of an award on 
the merits were enforceable because the FAA’s narrow grounds were 
default rules that would apply only if the parties did not agree other-
wise.
43
  Moreover, the first position viewed expanded judicial review as 
fully consonant with the FAA’s goal of enforcing parties’ agreements 
according to their terms.
44
  The second position was that expanded 
judicial review was in conflict with the FAA because it would create 
new obligations for the courts, which therefore would interfere with 
the independence of the arbitral process.
45
  Thus, FAA grounds were 
mandatory and exclusive, and parties could not contract around 
 
 38 See, e.g., id. (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, 
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.  
Just as [parties] may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may 
they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.” 
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 478–79 (1989)) . 
 39 See Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d 987; Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 
936–37 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 40 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935–36. 
 41 See Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000; Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936. 
 42 Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 1000. 
 43 See sources cited supra note 33. 
 44 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997), va-
cated, Kyocera, 341 F.3d 987. 
 45 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935–36. 
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them.  In March 2008, in Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that the 
grounds in the FAA were mandatory and exclusive.
46
 
B. The Hall Street Decision 
1. The Lower Court Decisions 
The Hall Street arbitration award occurred in a rather unusual 
context.  In the midst of a federal lawsuit over obligations under a 
lease, the parties decided that one issue—the question of Mattel’s ob-
ligation to indemnify the landlord, Hall Street, for clean-up costs of 
environmental damage—would be submitted to arbitration.47  The 
parties then entered into an arbitration agreement providing that any 




The district court approved the agreement and entered it as an 
order.
49
  After the arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Mattel, the 
district court, in accordance with the review permitted under the par-
ties’ agreement, vacated it for an error of law.50  On remand, the arbi-
trator ruled in favor of Hall Street.
51
  This time, the district court 
upheld the award.
52
  The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, on the 
grounds that the terms of the arbitration agreement providing for 
judicial review of the merits of the award were “unenforceable and 
severable.”53 
 
 46 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct 1396, 1406–08 (2008).  The 
Court specifically did not decide, and remanded to the Ninth Circuit to determine, 
whether grounds outside the FAA, based on state statutory or common law, or on 
rules of the federal district court, could provide additional grounds for review.  Id. at 
1407–08. 
 47 Id. at 1400. 
 48 The arbitration agreement provided in pertinent part: “The Court shall vacate, 
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are 
erroneous.”  Id. at 1400–01. 
 49 Id. at 1400. 
 50 Id. at 1401. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401. 
 53 Id.  After the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, the district court again decided in favor 
of Hall Street on different grounds, and the Ninth Circuit reversed again, after which 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id.  At the time the parties in Hall Street en-
tered into their arbitration agreement, the Ninth Circuit had determined that 
agreements for expanded judicial review were enforceable.  See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. 
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 890–91 (1997).  The court flip-flopped later in an en 
banc decision, Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (2003), 
so that by the time the parties in Hall Street appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Kyocera had 
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2. The Supreme Court Decision 
a. The Stated Policy Basis 
In holding that the FAA’s grounds for review of an award were 
mandatory and exclusive, the Supreme Court denied the parties any 
access to the courts for review on the merits.  Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Souter gave a brief mention of a policy justification, stating 
that expanded judicial review would “rende[r] informal arbitration 
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judi-
cial review process.”54  In other words, access to the courts for review 
on the merits would produce a less-efficient process.  The Court gave 
no consideration to any of the policy reasons in favor of expanded 
judicial review, such as party autonomy, freedom of contract, and the 
driving purpose behind the FAA “of ensuring that private arbitration 
agreements are enforced according to their terms.”55  Though it ac-
knowledged that “the FAA lets parties tailor some, even many fea-
tures of arbitration by contract,” 56  the Court said nothing about arbi-
tration’s core premise of being consensual.  Nor did it acknowledge, 
as the Tenth Circuit did, that expanded judicial review is still less of a 




The Court also failed to consider that even in jurisdictions where 
expanded judicial review was available, few parties had availed them-
selves of it.
58
  The vast majority preferred traditional arbitration.  But 
for parties who wanted a safety net, the Court’s decision denied them 
the choice of court review to ensure that their dispute was not re-
solved by an award that rested on an erroneous conclusion of law. 
b. Legislative History 
In addition to briefly mentioning efficiency as a reason for its 
decision, the Court, in a footnote, also gave a passing nod to the legis-
 
overruled LaPine, making an agreement to review an arbitration award on the merits 
unenforceable in the Ninth Circuit.  
 54 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405 (quoting Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998). 
 55 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 478 (1989). 
 56 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 57 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We 
recognize, of course, that even under expanded standards of review, arbitration re-
duces the burden on district courts.”) 
 58 See Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 32, at 18. 
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lative history of the FAA.
59
  It asserted that its decision was consistent 
with legislative history, citing testimony before the congressional sub-
committees in 1924 that referred only to the specific grounds that are 
contained in the statute.
60
 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the Court’s ruling not 
only conflicted with the core purpose of the FAA, but also ignored 
the historical context in which the Act was passed.
61
 
Before 1925, courts routinely refused to specifically enforce an 
arbitration agreement, although they would enforce arbitration 
awards.
62
  A party to an arbitration agreement could simply refuse to 
arbitrate with no adverse consequences.
63
  Although refusing to arbi-
trate was a breach of contract, it was difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove damages.
64
  The FAA was enacted to require specific enforce-
ment of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.65  According to Justice 
Stevens, because the principal purpose of the FAA was to “ensur[e] 
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their 
terms,”66 this purpose mandates “giv[ing] effect to parties’ fairly ne-
gotiated decisions to provide for judicial review of arbitration awards 
for errors of law.”67 
It is unlikely that it ever occurred to Congress or the drafters of 
the Act in 1924 that a party would want expanded judicial review, be-
cause courts were viewed as  unsupportive of arbitration at the time.
68
  
The drafters and proponents of the Act simply argued that the law 
 
 59 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406 n.7.  Justice Scalia, who joined in the opinion, did 
not join in this footnote.  Id. at 1400 n.*. 
 60 See id. at 1406. 
 61 See id. at 1408 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (noting that the arbitration agreement “was 
subject to revocation by either of the parties at any time before the award” and that 
this rendered the agreements “ineffectual” because “the party aggrieved by the refus-
al of the other party to carry out the arbitration agreement was without adequate re-
medy.”). 
 64 See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20 (1992); WESLEY A. STURGES, 
A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 255–62 (1930). 
 65 Hall St., 128 S. Ct at 1408 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[9 U.S.C. §2], which is the 
centerpiece of the FAA, reflects Congress’ main goal in passing the legislation: ‘to 
abrogate the general common-law rule against specific enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.’”) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 66 Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.; S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
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was necessary in order for arbitration agreements to be enforced.
69
  
The narrow grounds for review served to prevent courts from inter-
fering with the parties’ choice to have an arbitrator, rather than a 
court, decide the dispute.
70
  The focus was on restraining the courts, 
which were believed to be hostile to arbitration.
71
  There was no dis-
cussion of whether, if the parties themselves wanted more help from 
the court, they could agree on a more comprehensive review of the 
award.  At that point in time, the drafters and proponents of the Act 
were simply eager to have legislation that would cause the courts to 
overcome their objections to arbitration, enforce the agreement to 
arbitrate, then step back and let the arbitrator decide the dispute. 
The Court’s refusal to consider seriously the legislative history 
and purpose of the Act no doubt reflects the influence of Justice Sca-
lia and other “textualists,” who have asserted that to the extent that 
any legislative intent is pertinent, that intent is found in the text of 
the statute, and that legislative history is irrelevant.
72
  Textualists ex-
press concern that a purpose-driven focus on legislative history per-
mits too much judicial leeway, so that judges can look for and find 
support for any policy preferences they may have.
73
  Although some 
textualists will agree that the context of language matters, to them 
the “context” only includes dictionary definitions, textual canons, 
points of grammar, and use of the same language in another part of 
the same statute or in a different statute.
74
  In the textualists’ view, 
 
 69 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 34–35 (brief of Julius Cohen, the principal 
drafter of the FAA); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2. 
 70 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 36 (because the grounds to vacate, modify, or 
correct the award are narrow, “[t]here is no authority and no opportunity for the 
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should 
have been”) 
 71 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 39. 
 72 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29–37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 73 See id. at 17–18 (“[U]nder the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing un-
expressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objec-
tives and desires . . . .”); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legisla-
tive History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting 
her colleague Judge Leventhal’s observation that citing legislative history is akin to 
“looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”). 
 74  See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44 
(2006) (“[T]extualists . . . place heavy emphasis on dictionary definitions, the use of 
identical language in other statutory provisions, and ‘textual’ or ‘linguistic’ canons of 
construction that have nothing to do with statutory purposes or societal effects.”)  
According to Justice Scalia, these interpretive aids are indicia of “‘objectified’ intent,” 
which he views as “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of 
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legislative history has no value because Congress can have no ascer-
tainable group “intent.”  From the textualists’ perspective, the various 
members of Congress frequently have very little knowledge about the 
particular legislation, or have different preferences, priorities, or 
views of the legislation’s purpose.75  Moreover, the textualists raise an 
interest-group critique asserting the unreliability of legislative reports 




Increasingly, however, there is scholarly and judicial support for 
a larger view of “context,” one that includes the historical context of 
the statute and that considers legislative history a part of the constitu-
tional process deserving of consideration in the interpretation of any 
statute.
77
  Both analytical philosophy and political science have con-
tributed to our understanding of the validity of the collective intent 
of Congress,
78
 and political science scholarship is undercutting the 
 
the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”  Scalia, supra note 72, at 
17. 
 75  See Molot, supra note 74, at 28 (“[B]orrowing heavily from public choice 
theory, textualists emphasized that the legislative process is messy and full of com-
promises, some principled and some unprincipled.”). 
 76 See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptionalization of Legislative History in the Supreme 
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 215–16 (explaining that textualism “drew upon the Chi-
cago School of public choice theory to show that Congress, as a diverse body of non-
aggregable preferences, could not have a determinable group intent other than the 
formal one of enacted text”). 
 77 See BREYER, supra note 16, at 99 (“[A]n interpretation of a statute that tends to 
implement the legislator’s will helps to implement the public’s will and is therefore 
consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”); Paul E. McGreal, A Consti-
tutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1299 (2005) 
(“Because legislative history reflects the context of bicameralism and presentment, it 
provides the constitutionally preferred context for determining statutory meaning.”). 
 78 See Tiefer, supra note 76, at 260–63. 
[W]hen the kind of speech [legislators] produce is a statute, i.e., a so-
vereign command uttered by an institutional process, then, as in all 
such commands, the form of speech  itself implies an aim. If the 
speech is uttered by an institution, then the aim is an institutional aim 
devised as a collective intent. . . .  
     . . . . 
     Importantly, procedural stages—like moving a legislative bill out of 
committee, passing the bill in one chamber, [or] reporting from con-
ference . . . create ‘conditional rights. . . .’ 
     . . . Procedural stages and conditional rights serve as the means for 
institutions to express intent. None of this depends upon a group 
mind, or upon all members of the institution having a subjective 
awareness of all these aspects. 
Id.; see also James J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1002 
(2007) (“Advocates for an intentionalist approach have applied lessons from political 
science, democratic constitutionalism, analytic philosophy, and developmental psy-
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textualists’ assertions, derived from public choice theory, that legisla-
tive history cannot be relied upon because it is based on compromise 
and opportunistic activity.
79
  Theories of communication focus on sta-
tutory interpretation as “a constitutionally legitimate decoding of sta-
tutory commands,” 80 and find that an understanding of legislative 




Moreover, recent empirical research suggests that the liberal jus-
tices, the ones most likely to rely on legislative history, do not appear 
to do so in order to promote their preferred policy outcomes.
82
  A 
study focused on workplace lawsuits found that liberal justices used 
legislative history to help support pro-employer outcomes slightly 
more often than they did to justify pro-employee results.
83
  Contrary 
to the textualists’ view of legislative history as maximizing judicial 
leeway, the authors of this study concluded: 
The liberals’ regular and nuanced reliance on legislative history 
reflects their belief that history can help illuminate the dimen-
sions and details of complex legislative deals. More important, 
these Justices’ willingness to follow a legislative history trail lead-
ing away from their preferred policy perspectives indicates the 
principled nature of their interpretive approach.
84
 
Nonetheless, despite studies and scholarly commentary indicat-
ing that legislative history remains an important interpretive tool, in 
Hall Street, the Justices gave it very short shrift. 
 
chology to help justify the existence and importance of a collective legislative pur-
pose that can illuminate statutory meaning under the right conditions.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 79  See Tiefer, supra  note 76, at 267–68 (stating that political science researchers 
“cast doubt on the existence of a level of interest group distortion sufficient to make 
legislative history generally misleading and unhelpful” and “found voting in most 
congressional committees did not nearly diverge from voting in full chambers to the 
extent the interest group critique might suggest”).  Political scientists “have worked 
out new theories of the institutional role of committees that downplay concerns 
about extreme strategic distortion argued by the special interest critique.”  Id. at 268. 
 80 Boudreau et al., supra note 16, at 959.  While cautioning that “not all legislative 
history is created equal,” the authors point out that when judges are privy to the leg-
islative process, they “understand better the way that legislators compress statutory 
meaning and the way that they (the judges) should expand it.”  Id. at 973. 
 81 See id. at 973. 
 82 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative His-
tory: Principle, Strategy and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 154 
(2008).  
 83 See id. at 153–54. 
 84 Id. at 160. 
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c. The Statutory Text 
In Hall Street, although the Court briefly expressed a concern 
about efficiency and noted its belief that its decision was consistent 
with legislative history, the core rationale for its decision rested on 
the text of the statute, or, more precisely, the absence of text.
85
  Es-
sentially, the Court determined that since the statute does not specif-
ically provide that the parties can agree on other grounds for judicial 
review, the narrow statutory grounds are therefore exclusive.
86
  Ac-
cording to the Court, even if the text of sections 10 and 11 of the FAA 
could be “supplemented to some extent, it would stretch basic inter-
pretive principles to expand the stated grounds to the point of evi-
dentiary and legal review generally.”87  The Court then pulled out the 
rule of ejusdem generis, for an “implicit lesson.”88  This canon of con-
struction is a short-hand way of saying that when several specific items 
are followed by a general item, the general item should be inter-
preted as being in the same category as the specific items.
89
  If, for ex-
 
 85 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404–05 (2008). 
 86 Id. at 1404. 
 87 Id.  The pertinent grounds for vacating an award in section 10 include the fol-
lowing: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means;  
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, 
or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly ex-
ecuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).  Under section 10, “[i]f an award is vacated and the time 
within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the 
court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”  Id. § 10(b).  The 
pertinent grounds for modifying or correcting an award in section 11 include the 
following: 
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an 
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or 
property referred to in the award. 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted 
to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision 
upon the matter submitted. 
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the 
merits of the controversy. 
Id. § 11. 
 88 Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 89 Id. 
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ample, there is a bill of sale for a farm that includes “cattle, hogs, and 
other animals,” the “other animals” would probably be interpreted as 
including other farm animals but not the pet puppy of the farmer’s 
child.
90
  In sections 10 and 11, however, there is no general term that 
follows the several specific terms,
91
 so there is no reason for ejusdem 
generis to apply.  But the Court’s “implicit lesson” is that, because a 
general term—if one existed—would be linked to the earlier specific 
terms, when there is no term at all, there can be “no textual hook for 
expansion.”92 
The Court’s “implicit lesson” is simply wrong because  it is based 
on a false use of the canon.  The application of ejusdem generis cannot 
legitimately be twisted into a means of creating a prohibition not 
found in the statute.  When there is no prohibition in the text, the 
Court should look to the legislative history, the context of the statute, 
and any pertinent public policy to ascertain if there is any reason to 
have such a prohibition.
93
 
Moreover, the text itself provides a basis for supporting party au-
tonomy.  Section 10(a)(4) states that an award may be vacated “where 
the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”94  The powers of arbitrators 
derive from the consent of the parties.
95
  Thus, the text of section 
10(a)(4) implies that Congress intended the parties to be able to de-
termine the nature and extent of arbitrator power, which could rea-
sonably include curtailing that power by making it subject to judicial 
 
 90 Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. 
REV. 833, 853 (1964). 
 91 See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405. 
 92 Id. at 1404. 
 93 Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that “[a] decision ‘not to regulate’ the terms 
of an agreement that does not even arguably offend any public policy whatsoever, ‘is 
adequately justified by a presumption in favor of freedom.’” Id. at 1409–10 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)). 
 94 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006). 
 95 See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (2008) (“The parties’ consent provides the underpin-
ning for the power of the arbitrators to decide the dispute.  The parties’ consent also 
limits an arbitrator’s power because an arbitrator can only decide issues within the 
scope of the parties’ agreement.”); Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 3 (2006) (“Arbitration rests 
on a firm foundation of party autonomy. The parties own the dispute, and should be 
able to control the details of their disputing process.”) (citation omitted); see also Ga-
teway Techs, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Arbi-
tration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally 
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”) (quoting Mastrobuono 
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).  
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review on the merits.
96
  Certainly, nothing in the statutory language 
contradicts this interpretation, and it reflects a more reasonable in-
terpretation of the text than does the far-fetched and false applica-
tion of ejusdem generis. 
The Court has gone off track in its interpretive principles by es-
sentially ignoring the legislative history and context of the statute.  A 
number of scholars have asserted that although textualists claim that 
their objection to legislative history is that it permits judges to mani-
pulate meaning, textualists themselves, by ignoring the historical con-
text of the statute, can and do engage in greater manipulation of 
meaning to accord with their values.
97
  A textualist judge may “con-
fuse his own idiosyncratic reading of the statutory text with the clear 
meaning that a reasonable reader or legislator would assign to that 
text.”98  In doing so, the judge is exacerbating, rather than eliminat-
ing, the problem of judicial leeway. 
The interpretation of the FAA in Hall Street is an example of the 
Court being led astray by an overemphasis on textualism, including 
an inaccurate and improper resort to a canon of interpretation.  The 
purpose of the FAA was to require courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements and to limit their interference with the process.
99
  All of 
the narrow grounds of sections 10 and 11 pertain to the limited areas 
where courts would be authorized to interfere because the integrity 
of the process had been undermined by the arbitrator’s conduct or 
because mistakes of form had occurred.
100
  The absence of a general 
 
 96 See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitra-
tion, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 73 (1999) (“Congress would not have granted such express 
authority [in section 10(a)(4)] unless it intended some ability of the arbitral signato-
ries to shape the nature of arbitration and judicial review.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Molot, supra, note 74, at 49, 54. 
If . . . modern textualists . . . place too much emphasis on statutory text 
as a means of cabining judicial leeway, they . . .  run the risk that they . . 
. will render judges less, rather than more, faithful to Congress’s in-
structions.  
     . . . . 
     . . .  The more often judges exclude statutory purposes, and try to 
resolve (or eliminate) statutory ambiguity using textualist tools alone, 
the more likely it is that legislators’ purposes will be frustrated. 
Id. 
 98 Id. at 53. 
 99 Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 
231 (1997).  The purpose of the limited review provisions of section 10 is “to insulate 
[awards] from parochial or intrusive judicial review” so that parties “need not fear an 
officious or meddlesome inquiry into the merits which would impair the efficacy of 
the arbitral process for them.”  Id. 
 100 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2006). 
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term pertaining to grounds for judicial review at the end of the list of 
specific grounds in sections 10 and 11 does not mean that the statute 
has anything at all to say about party agreements on judicial review.  
Sections 10 and 11 impose a limit on what courts can do under the sta-
tute.
101
  They do not, however, limit what parties can agree to.  Ejusdem 
generis cannot be stretched to restrict what parties can agree to when 
the statutory text does not deal at all with party agreements.  By twist-
ing the use of ejusdem generis, and also by divorcing the text from the 
context and meaning of the statute at the time of its enactment, the 
Court has simply manipulated the text to reach the result it pre-
ferred: restricting parties’ access to the courts.102 
d. The Elimination of “Manifest Disregard” 
In addition to interpreting the statute to prohibit parties from 
agreeing to expanded judicial review, the Court also appeared to 
eliminate the judicially created ground for review known as “manifest 
disregard” of the law.103  “Manifest disregard” has been applied by 
every federal circuit court
104
 and the Supreme Court has occasionally 
referred to it when reviewing an arbitration award.
105
  Courts have 
generally understood “manifest disregard” to mean that a court can 
vacate an award if an arbitrator knew what the law was but neverthe-
less disregarded it.
106
  The courts probably created the doctrine be-
cause of an instinctive resistance to letting stand an award that was 
based on an egregious error of the law.  Many courts have cited as au-
thority the 1953 Supreme Court case of Wilko v. Swan.
107
  In that case, 
the Court said in dicta that “[i]n unrestricted submissions . . . the in-
terpretations of the law by the arbitrators, in contrast to manifest disre-
gard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error 
 
 101 See id. 
 102 Some commentators have criticized the use of canons of construction for any 
purpose.  For example, Richard Posner opined that canons of construction “no more 
enable difficult questions of interpretation to be answered than the maxims of every-
day life enable the difficult problems of everyday living to be solved.”  RICHARD 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 280 (1990).  Professor Alan Scott Rau has 
specifically criticized the Hall Street decision for its “grotesque deficiencies in 
craftsmanship, in rhetoric, in argument,” and as “ represent[ing] a new low in con-
text-free, policy-free, abstract, non-functional decision-making.”  Alan Scott Rau, Fear 
of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 482, 485 (2008). 
 103 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953). 
 104 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 234 
(2007). 
 105 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).    
 106 See Drahozal, supra note 104, at 234, 235–36. 
 107 346 U.S. 427. 
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in interpretation.”108  In other words, if the arbitrator made an error 
of law, this would not be a ground for review unless the arbitrator’s 
interpretation was so extreme as to amount to a manifest disregard of 




Hall Street presented the Court with a “manifest disregard” ar-
gument: because judges had created “manifest disregard” as a 
ground for vacating an award that was not in the text of the FAA, the 
limited grounds of the statutory text were not exclusive.
110
  The 
Court’s response was that “Hall Street overlooks the fact that the 
statement it relies on [from Wilko] expressly rejects just what Hall 
Street asks for here, general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.”111  
This response is not on point because it ignores the thrust of Hall 
Street’s argument.  Hall Street never asserted that either the FAA or 
Wilko had provided for “general review of an arbitrator’s legal er-
rors.”112  Rather, its position was simply that a widely used judicially 
created ground for review undermines the position that the express 
statutory grounds are exclusive.
113
 
Although the Court never responded directly to that argument, 
its opinion in Hall Street nonetheless appears to have eliminated “ma-
nifest disregard” as a separate ground for review of an award.  The 
Court suggested that the Wilko dicta was “vague[]” and might have 
merely been a reference “to the [section] 10 grounds collectively, ra-
ther than an addition to them.”114  This was somewhat surprising be-
cause in 1995, in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,
115
 the Court, citing 
Wilko favorably in dicta, appeared to accept “manifest disregard” as a 
ground for vacating an award, stating: 
The party still can ask a court to review the arbitrator’s decision, 
but the court will set that decision aside only in very unusual cir-
cumstances.  See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (award procured by corrup-
tion, fraud, or undue means; arbitrator exceeded his powers); 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37, 98 L. Ed. 168, 74 S. Ct. 182 
 
 108 Id. at 436–37 (emphasis added). 
 109 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 1404. 
 112 See id. 
 113 The Court mentioned in passing that a “supposed judicial expansion by inter-
pretation” might be different from a “private expansion by contract,” but still did not 
respond to Hall Street’s position concerning the nonexclusive character of the statu-
tory grounds for review.  See id. 
 114 See id. at 1404. 
 115 514 U.S. 938. 
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(1953) (parties bound by arbitrator’s decision not in “manifest 
disregard” of the law), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 104 L. Ed. 2d 526, 
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
116
 
Thus, in Wilko and First Options the Court acknowledged that 
courts may set aside an arbitral award either under one of the 
grounds listed in the section 10 of the FAA, or because the arbitrator 
acted in “manifest disregard” of the law.117  Nonetheless, in Hall Street, 
the Court backpedaled, declaring that “[m]aybe the term ‘manifest 
disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it 
merely referred to the [section] 10 grounds collectively,” or, maybe it 
was a “shorthand for [section] 10(a)(3) or [section] 10 (a)(4).”118  
The Court then asserted that “[w]e, speaking as a Court, have merely 
taken the Wilko language as we found it, without embellishment.”119  
The Court’s final word, however, appears to be the nail in the coffin 
of “manifest disregard.”  “[N]ow that its meaning is implicated, we 
see no reason to accord it the significance that Hall Street urges.”120  
The significance urged by Hall Street was that “manifest disregard” 
was “a further ground for vacatur on top of those listed in [section] 
10.”121  Thus, the Court’s decision that it was not a further ground 
appears to have eliminated “manifest disregard” as a separate ground 





 116 Id. at 942. 
 117 See id. 
 118 128 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 119 Id. (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 942). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1403. 
 122 After Hall Street, a number of federal courts have held that the decision made 
clear that manifest disregard of the law is not an independent basis on which to va-
cate an arbitration award.  See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 
349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 
n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 
998–99 (D. Minn. 2008); T. Co. Metals LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., No. 07-
7747, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112087, at *8 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2008); Ascension Or-
thopedics, Inc. v. Curasan, AG, No. 07-4033, 2008 WL 2074058, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 
14, 2008).  Other federal courts take the position that Hall Street did not abrogate the 
manifest disregard doctrine altogether because it remains as a judicial gloss on the 
specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10.  See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. 
Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 145 
(2009); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93–95 (2nd Cir. 
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009). The Sixth Circuit has taken various posi-
tions.  See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bank of Okla., 304 F. App’x 360, 363–64 
(6th Cir. 2008) (manifest disregard maintains validity, but may be judicial gloss on 9 
U.S.C. § 10); Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. App’x 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2008) 
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To the extent that it has eliminated “manifest disregard,” the 
Court has removed a safety net, albeit a narrow one.  Arbitrating par-
ties appear to have no right to any review of an arbitral award that 
rests on an arbitrator’s deliberate, erroneous conclusion of law.  Such 
a result can impact not only our system of justice, but also how parties 
perceive the functioning of arbitration within that system.  The ab-
sence of any possible review is particularly significant in light of the 
Supreme Court’s delegation to private citizen-arbitrators of the judi-
cial power to decide claims under regulatory statutes. 
III. THE MITSUBISHI DECISION 
A. Interpretive Methodology 
It is instructive to compare the interpretive methodology in Hall 
Street with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Mitsubishi, which 
held that antitrust claims were arbitrable under the FAA.
123
  In Hall 
Street, the Court twisted a canon of construction to claim that the ab-
sence of any mention of additional grounds for review in the FAA 
 
(award vacated because arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 81 (2009); Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d 
558, 561 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding manifest disregard to be a non-statutory 
ground for vacatur, but providing a “but see” cite to Hall Street).  In October 2009, 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in three cases that specifically raised the issue 
of whether “manifest disregard” was a valid ground for vacatur under the FAA.  See 
Improv W. Assocs. v. Comedy Club, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 145 (2009); Grain v. Trinity 
Health, 130 S. Ct. 96 (2009); Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 130 S. Ct. 81 (2009).  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Ani-
malFeeds Int’l Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009).  Although the question presented in Stolt-
Nielsen was whether, under the FAA, a class action can be imposed on parties whose 
arbitration clauses are silent on that issue, the Court may well deal with the question 
of manifest disregard because it was a basis for the district court’s vacatur of an arbi-
tral award.  See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). It was reversed by the Second Circuit, Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 102, 
which nonetheless contended that the manifest disregard doctrine survived in li-
mited form. Id. at 93–95. Thus, the Supreme Court may soon give further guidance 
as to the doctrine of manifest disregard. 
State courts as well, in applying the FAA, have adopted one of the two positions.  
One position is that, post-Hall Street, manifest disregard of the law “is no longer an 
independent and proper basis under the Federal Arbitration Act for vacating, mod-
ifying, or correcting an arbitrator’s award.”  Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d 
375, 381 (Ala. 2009); see also Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So. 2d 462, 467 n.2 
(Ala. 2008).  The second position is that the concept of “manifest disregard” is an 
interpretive standard such that existing case law can be used to interpret section 
10(a)(4) of the FAA.  In re Johnson, 864 N.Y.S.2d 873, 886–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); 
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348–49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 123 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 619 
(1985). 
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constituted textual evidence that the grounds were prohibited.
124
  By 
contrast, in Mitsubishi, the Court decided that the absence of any 
mention in the FAA that statutory claims were covered constituted 
textual evidence that such claims were not prohibited.
125
  According to 
the Court, such unmentioned claims were included within the scope 
of enforceable agreements to arbitrate.
126
 
In Mitsubishi, the dispute was between a Puerto Rican car dealer-
ship and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese corporation with 
its principal place of business in Tokyo.
127
  The parties’ contract pro-
vided for arbitration in Japan.
128
  The Puerto Rican dealership raised 
antitrust claims that it believed should be litigated.
129
  The Court held 




Mitsubishi was decided in 1985, before Justice Scalia joined the 
Court and before his brand of textualism had great influence there.
131
  
Nonetheless, as in Hall Street, the Court in Mitsubishi did not pay se-
rious attention to the legislative history of the FAA.
132
  Neither the 
text of the statute nor the legislative history provides that the FAA was 
intended to apply to statutory claims.  The statutory text refers only to 
contract claims and maritime transactions.  The pertinent language 
of section 2, which establishes the scope of the Act, states: 
 
 124 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396,  1404–05, 1408.  The 
Court equated “no textual hook for expansion” with a statutory prohibition of ex-
pansion of grounds for review by party agreement, holding the stated statutory 
grounds were exclusive.  Id. 
 125 See 473 U.S. at 625–26. 
 126 See id. 
 127 Id. at 616–17. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 619. 
 130 Id. at 638–40. 
 131 See Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal 
Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 823 (2002) (“In 1986, President Reagan appointed Jus-
tice Scalia to the Supreme Court.  Since joining the Court, Justice Scalia has sought 
to make a statute’s text the primary factor in statutory interpretation.”). 
 132 This is perhaps because the Court had earlier made a number of decisions 
which ignored the legislative history.  Thus, to bring forth a careful analysis of legisla-
tive history in Mitsubishi might risk disturbing precedents set in earlier cases.  See, e.g., 
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent in 
Southland, the Court in that case, despite the facial silence of section 2 of the FAA, 
interpreted the statute to apply in state as well as federal courts.  Id. at 22–23 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision . . . utterly fails to recognized the 
clear congressional intent underlying the FAA. Congress intended to require federal, 
not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.”) 
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 




Nothing in this language provides that the Act applies to statuto-
ry claims.  The focus is on contract claims between merchants or ma-
ritime parties involved in commerce. The statute is silent as to statu-
tory claims.  To assert that the FAA applies to statutory claims, one 
must resort to interpretive tools.  One might, for example, argue 
from the text that the language of section 2 focusing on “a controver-
sy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the refusal 
to perform the whole or any part thereof” could be interpreted to 
mean a statutory claim that arises under or out of a contract.  This 
only becomes a plausible interpretation, however, if one ignores the 
historical context of the enactment and centuries of arbitration prac-
tice.  For over three hundred years, arbitration was understood to be 
a way for disputes between merchants to be resolved among their 
peers, who understood business requirements and mores, rather than 
by judges, who were less informed about normal business practices.
134
  
A recent scholarly article has provided persuasive historical and tex-
tual evidence that the FAA is a direct descendent of the 1698 Arbitra-
tion Act, which was adopted by the English Parliament in order to 
strengthen the autonomy of arbitration as a means for promoting the 
economic interests of businesses, merchants, and traders.
135
  Like the 
U.S. Congress of 1925, King William III and Parliament in 1698 
wanted common law arbitrators to respond to merchants’ concerns 
that their disputes be resolved quickly and efficiently by individuals 
knowledgeable about business practices.
136
  The focus was on contract 
 
 133 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 134 See Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the De-
mise of Judicial Review,  2009  J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2–3, 21–22.  LeRoy’s research revealed 
that very few courts reviewed statutory arbitrations.  Id. at 22–23.  Such arbitrations 
were a rare phenomenon.  These unusual cases do not detract from the fact that un-
til Mitsubishi, statutory claims were, with few exceptions (unknown to most people) 
simply not arbitrated. 
 135 See id. at 15–16, 29–31.  The author provides charts comparing the specific and 
sometimes identical language used in the FAA and in the 1698 Arbitration Act, as 
well as in William Blackstone’s Commentaries and other English treatises.  See id. at 
29, 31. 
 136 See id. at 4. 
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As inheritors of this tradition, members of the 1925 Congress 
indicated that arbitrators under the FAA would continue to decide 
the same kinds of business and merchant disputes that had been arbi-
trated for centuries.
138
  Statutory claims were never mentioned in any 
of the hearings before Congress or in the written materials submitted 
to the congressional subcommittees.
139
  The proponents of the Act 
were businessmen and their lawyers who wanted arbitration clauses 
between merchants to be enforced in federal court.  Julius Cohen, 
one of the primary drafters of the Act, co-wrote an article shortly after 
the passage of the Act in which he explained the purpose and effect 
of the Act to the legal community.
140
  Specifically, he noted that arbi-
tration was “not the proper method for deciding points of law of ma-
jor importance involving constitutional questions or policy in the ap-
plication of statutes.”141  Rather, arbitration was well-suited to “the 
questions of law which arise out of [the] daily relations between mer-
chants as to the passage of title, the existence of warranties or [re-
lated] questions of law.”142  This was consistent with the position pre-
sented by the proponents in the congressional hearings, which was 
that making arbitration agreements enforceable would enable mer-
chants to resolve their contract disputes cheaply and easily.
143
 
B. A Paradigm Shift 
A major paradigmatic and unexpected shift in arbitration prac-
tice followed the Supreme Court’s 1985 holding in Mitsubishi that an-
 
 137 See id. at 2–3, 21–22. 
 138 For example, the House Report accompanying the bill provided as follows:  
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of 
the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agree-
ment. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it be-
comes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed 
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.   
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 139 See generally Joint Hearings, supra note 1; Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Be-
fore a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1923); S. REP. NO. 68-536 
(1924); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96. 
 140 Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. 
L. REV. 265 (1926). 
 141 Id. at 281. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Charles Bernheimer, Chair-
man, Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York). 
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titrust claims could be arbitrated. The Court read the arbitration 
clause as not only encompassing a claim of failure to perform the 
contract, but also as including a claim of an independent violation of 
federal law.
144
 Application of the FAA to independent violations of law 
outside of a contract was a new concept,
145
 a concept created by the 
Court and not supported by either the text or the legislative history of 
the statute.
146
  Moreover, at the time the Court decided Mitsubishi, the 
circuit courts that had been faced with the question of whether anti-
trust claims could be arbitrated had unanimously and unequivocally 
answered “no.”147  The lead case on this point, American Safety Equip-
ment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,
148
 provided four basic reasons why an-
titrust claims were not arbitrable.  First, a claim under antitrust law is 
not a mere private matter.
149
  A plaintiff asserting rights under the Act 
is acting as a private attorney general to protect the public interest in 
a competitive economy.
150
  Second, alleged monopolists, who fre-
quently engage in adhesion contracts with their customers, should 
not be able to determine the forum for deciding an antitrust claim.
151
  
Third, because antitrust claims tend to be complex and fact-intensive, 
the kinds of evidence needed to prove a case is better able to be ob-
tained and considered in a judicial forum than an arbitral one.
152
  
Fourth, commercial arbitrators tend to be drawn from the business 
community and are likely to be focused on the issues between the 
 
 144 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 
(1985). 
 145 Although Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), involved a claim of a 
breach of contractual warranties as well as a claim that the breach amounted to fraud 
under the securities laws, the Court in Mitsubishi considered for the first time “the 
question whether a standard arbitration clause referring to claims arising out of or 
relating to a contract should be construed to cover statutory claims that have only an 
indirect relationship to the contract.”  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646–47 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
 146 As Justice Stevens explained, in his dissent,  
The plain language of this statute encompasses Soler’s claims that arise 
out of its contract with Mitsubishi, but does not encompass a claim aris-
ing under federal law[] . . . .  Nothing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor 
its legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the 
arbitration of any statutory claims.  
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 147 Id. at 656 (citing cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits). 
 148 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 149 Id. at 826. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See id. at 827. 
 152 See id. 
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Another factor that may well have influenced the circuit courts 
was that Congress provided in the Sherman Act that antitrust claims 
could only be decided in federal court, not in state court.
154
  If the 
courts of the sovereign states were not thought competent to decide 
antitrust claims, it is not surprising that the lower courts did not view 
arbitrators as having that competence.
155
 
Even though there was no evidence in the text of the statute or 
the legislative history that the FAA applied to statutory claims, and 
even though no lower court had ever found that antitrust claims were 
arbitrable under the FAA, the Supreme Court had no difficulty con-
struing the FAA to cover the antitrust claims raised in Mitsubishi.
156
  It 
did this in two steps.  First, the Court emphasized a strong federal 
policy in favor of arbitration.
157
  Second, it focused on the antitrust 
statute, asserting that if Congress had not intended the statute to be 
arbitrated, it would have so indicated within the statute itself.
158
 
1. Federal Policy as a Basis for the Shift 
With respect to the strong federal policy, the Court stated that 
“the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration 
Act . . . requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration 
 
 153 See id. 
 154 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006); Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Share & M.S. 
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922). 
 155 One might argue that since parties can withdraw their antitrust dispute from a 
court for purposes of settlement, they should be able to withdraw or opt out of court 
jurisdiction for purposes of arbitrating antitrust claims.  This would be a persuasive 
argument if it applied to postdispute decisions to arbitrate antitrust claims.  It is less 
persuasive in a predispute situation, when parties have entered into a contract and 
agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes without any expectation that an antitrust 
claim might arise.  Until Mitsubishi, parties could confidently assume that they had 
not agreed to arbitrate antitrust claims when they agreed to an arbitration clause in 
their contract.  See supra text accompanying note 26.  Because antitrust claims tend to 
arise in situations where one party is likely to have much more economic power than 
the other, it is quite plausible that the weaker party will have no leverage to resist an 
arbitration clause in the first instance.  In arbitration, the weaker party will not have 
the same rights of discovery that it would have in court, which means it will be less 
able to establish its case under the laws Congress enacted for its protection.  By mak-
ing antitrust claims arbitrable, the Supreme Court has weakened the antitrust protec-
tions enacted by Congress. 
 156 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624–26 
(1985). 
 157 See id. at 625–26. 
 158 See id. at 627–28. 
MOSES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2010  12:29 PM 
174 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:147 
agreements covered by that Act.”159  The Court noted that “questions 
of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the feder-
al policy favoring arbitration.”160 
The claim that the FAA manifests a congressional policy favoring 
arbitration, widely repeated by the Supreme Court and the lower 
courts, is a judicial fiction.  Congress should pay attention when the 
Court takes its name in vain.  There is no evidence in the text or the 
legislative history of the FAA that Congress in any way favored arbitra-
tion over litigation.
161
  The goal of the FAA was to provide merchants 
who wanted to arbitrate the possibility of having their arbitration 
agreements enforced.
162
  At no time was there any discussion of “fa-
voring” arbitration.  At best, the FAA was simply supposed to make 
arbitration contracts as enforceable as other contracts.
163
  Leveling the 
playing field does not indicate a preference for arbitration. 
The first Supreme Court statement that there was a federal poli-
cy favoring arbitration came from dicta in the 1983 case of Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.
164
  There, the 
Court cited no authority supporting its dicta in either the text or the 
legislative history of the FAA.  Rather, it appears that the Court may 
have relied upon lower court cases that appropriated from the collec-
tive bargaining context language that asserted arbitration was fa-
vored.
165
  Indeed, in Mitsubishi, as if to supplement the Moses Cone dic-
ta, the Court cited as authority for a federal policy favoring 
arbitration United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., a labor 
arbitration case from the well-known Steelworkers Trilogy.
166
  It is true 
that in labor law there are strong reasons to favor arbitration because 
 
 159 Id. at 627. 
 160 Id. at 626 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 161 See, e.g., Moses, supra note 1, at 123; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 29 – 30.  
 162 See supra notes 136–43 and accompanying text. 
 163 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon 
the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”). 
 164 See 460 U.S. at 24–25 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state or procedural 
policies to the contrary. . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of feder-
al law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in fa-
vor of arbitration . . . .”). 
 165 See, e.g., Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Audioradiowerk GmbH, 585 
F.2d 39, 44–45 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing a number of collective bargaining cases as sup-
port for the premise that there was a strong policy favoring arbitration). 
 166 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
648–49 & n.14 (1985) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581–83 (1960)). 
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of its contribution to industrial peace and the central role it plays in 
the institution of collective bargaining.
167
  There is, however, no simi-
lar justification for favoring arbitration in a commercial or a non-
union setting.
168
  As noted by labor law professor Samuel Estreicher, 
“Arbitration in nonunion settings does not warrant an aggressive pro-
arbitration policy akin to the Steelworkers Trilogy.”169  Similarly, in a 
commercial setting there is no policy reason for favoring arbitration 
over litigation. Rather, contracts to arbitrate should be no more and 
no less enforceable than other contracts.
170
 
There is a significant difference in asserting, on the one hand, 
that there is a federal policy that arbitration agreements should be 
enforced according to the parties’ intent and proclaiming, on the 
other hand, that there is a federal policy that favors arbitration over 
litigation as a basis for broadening the scope of the FAA.  It is reason-
ably consistent with the congressional policy of 1924 to say, as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did in Robert Lawrence 
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., that there is a policy of promoting en-
forcement of arbitration agreements “to accord with the original in-
tention of the parties . . . .”171  But it is substantially different to claim 
broadly, as the Court did in Moses Cone, that “the scope of arbitrable 
 
 167 See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 578 (“A major factor in achieving industrial 
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective 
bargaining agreement.”) (citation omitted).  
 168 See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 753, 797 (1990). 
 169 Id. 
 170 In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967), 
the Court stated that “the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” It should be noted, 
however, that this statement was made within the context of a general understanding 
that the contracts being considered were merchant contracts, not adhesion con-
tracts.  It is less clear that an arbitration agreement within an adhesion contract 
should be as enforceable as other contracts.  The legislative history demonstrates the 
concern members of Congress had that arbitration not be mandated in a take-it-or-
leave-it context. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1, at 9–15; see also Moses, supra note 1, at 
106–08 (describing hearings where Congress members expressed concern about 
take-it-or-leave-it contracts).  In an arbitration agreement, parties have given up im-
portant constitutional rights to a jury trial, and those rights should only be given up 
knowingly and voluntarily.  See Jean Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the 
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 
678–79 (2001).  Thus, it makes sense to apply a different standard of enforceability to 
the separate agreement that constitutes an agreement to arbitrate within an adhesion 
contract to the extent that no actual (knowing and voluntary) consent was given.  
The arbitration clause should therefore be less enforceable than other agreements 
within an adhesion contract, if actual consent cannot be established, and jury trial 
rights were not surrendered knowingly and voluntarily. 
 171 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959). 
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issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration”172 and to rely, as the 
Court did in Mitsubishi, on “the federal policy favoring arbitration” in 
order to expand the coverage of the statute.
173
 
Nonetheless, this judge-created policy to favor arbitration was 
the Court’s linchpin for determining that the FAA permitted anti-
trust claims to be arbitrated.  The Mitsubishi Court found “no reason 
to depart from [the policy favoring arbitration] where a party bound 
by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory 
rights.”174  Thus, although the text and legislative history do not pro-
vide that the FAA applies to statutes, much less to antitrust claims, 
and do not suggest that Congress in any way favored arbitration over 
litigation, the “federal policy favoring arbitration” was the Court’s ba-
sis for significantly expanding the statute to cover an area of law that 
no previous court had ever held to be arbitrable.
175
  Using its own ju-
dicially-created policy as a basis for expanding the scope of a statute 
far beyond its purpose is a clear example of the Court reaching 
beyond its constitutional powers and engaging in a legislative act.
176
 
2. The Antitrust Statute as a Basis for the Shift 
In the second step of its analysis, in order to buttress its decision 
that the FAA covered statutory claims, the Court shifted focus away 
from the FAA and to the antitrust statute that provided the particular 
substantive right.  The Court asserted that if Congress did not intend 
a particular statutory claim to be arbitrated, it had to indicate ex-
pressly that intention in the statute it enacted.
177
  Thus, according to 
the Court, if nothing in the text or legislative history of the antitrust 
law indicated that claims under the law could not be arbitrated, it 
 
 172 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983). 
 173 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 
(1985) (citing Moses Cone., 460 U.S. at 24–25). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See, e.g., Boudreau et al., supra note 16, at 964 (“When an interpreter substi-
tutes his or her own meaning for the meaning intended by Congress, the interpreter 
usurps the authority granted to the legislature by the Constitution. Such actions ille-
gitimately undermine democratic principles.”); Molot, supra note 74, at 58 (“[T]he 
constitutional structure generally requires judicial fidelity to Congress. . . . To be tru-
ly faithful to Congress, and to fulfill their role in the constitutional structure, [judges 
should] respect Congress’s purposes and policies as well as the words Congress ac-
tually enacts into law[.]”). 
 177 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that “[h]aving made the bargain to arbi-
trate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to 
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”). 
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Of course, there is no indication that Congress ever foresaw a 
need to state that antitrust claims could not be arbitrated.
179
  Provid-
ing specifically that antitrust claims were to be determined in federal 
court
180
 suggests that Congress did not intend them to be arbitrated, 
but that was not sufficient for the Mitsubishi Court.  Remarkably, it 
reached its decision without regard to an earlier Supreme Court deci-
sion interpreting the language in the Sherman Act to mean that an 
antitrust treble-damages case “can only be brought in a District Court 
of the United States.”181 
The Court then discarded all of the policy reasons advanced by 
the Second Circuit in American Safety for finding antitrust claims not 
arbitrable
182
 and proceeded to emphasize the international nature of 
the claim as a further reason to find that the antitrust claims were ar-
bitrable.
183
  In future cases, however, the international rationale 





 178 Id. (“We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection af-
forded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial 
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”). 
 179  At the time of the enactment of the Sherman Act (1890) and the Clayton Act 
(1914), which preceded the 1925 FAA, arbitration agreements to resolve even con-
tract disputes were not enforceable, so Congress would hardly have thought it neces-
sary to say that antitrust claims could not be arbitrated.  See Moses, supra note 1, at 
123; supra notes 63–65. 
 180 The Sherman Act provides in pertinent part, 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district where the defendant 
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006). 
 181 Blumenstock Bros. Adver. Agency v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440 
(1920). 
 182 See supra text accompanying notes 148–153. 
 183 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631. 
 184 By the time of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), sixteen 
years had passed since Mitsubishi and the Court had found many different kinds of 
statutory claims arbitrable.  In Gilmer, which involved a mandatory arbitration clause 
in an age discrimination case, the Court noted that “[i]t is now clear that statutory 
claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the 
FAA.”  Id. at 26. 
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3. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning 
It is striking, however, that although the Court pointed to no 
evidence in the text or legislative history of the FAA that the Act was 
intended to cover statutory claims, these lacunae did not present an 
impediment to arbitration of such claims because of the so called 
“strong federal policy” favoring arbitration.185  One would think that 
this “strong federal policy,” which, according to the Court, ensures 
“that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their 
terms,”186 would have produced a different result in Hall Street, where 
the parties’ agreement provided for expanded judicial review.  But in 
that case, the Court did not focus on the strong federal policy of en-
forcing the parties’ agreement according to its terms, but rather on 
an interpretation of the silence of the text.  According to the Court, 
the absence in the statutory text of any reference to party consent to 
expanded judicial review meant it was prohibited.  Ironically, in Mit-
subishi, the Court reasoned by contrast that even though statutory 
claims were not mentioned in the text, the silence of the text meant 
that such claims were presumed to be arbitrable under the FAA.
187
 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in these two cases appears not 
to be shaped by the FAA itself, but by the result the Court wished to 
reach.  One could easily switch the reasoning between the two cases 
and reach the exactly opposite result.  In Hall Street, because party 
agreements for expanded judicial review are not specifically prohi-
bited by the statute, they should be enforced consistent with the 
strong federal policy to enforce arbitration agreements according to 
their terms.  In Mitsubishi, because the text is focused on commercial 
contracts and maritime transactions, and because there is no indica-
tion in the legislative history that statutory claims were intended to be 
covered by the Act, the FAA should only apply to contract claims and 
maritime transactions.  This reasoning—the reverse of the reasoning 
applied by the Court in the two decisions—produces results that are 
much more consistent with both the text and the legislative history of 
the Act.  In other words, in both cases, the Court got it exactly wrong. 
If one attempted to reconcile the decisions in the two cases, it 
could be argued that the reason the interpretive methodology dif-
fered was that the purpose in each case was the same: to interpret the 
statute as broadly as possible both by expanding the scope of the FAA 
 
 185 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. 
 186 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 478 (1989). 
 187 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. 
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beyond the text of the statute in Mitsubishi, and by narrowing the de-
fenses to enforcement in Hall Street through a strict reading of the sta-
tutory text.  While this may be true, this simply demonstrates that the 
methodology was result-oriented, and that the result had nothing to 
do with legislative intent.  Rather, the result sought and achieved was 
a judicial goal of reducing access to the courts by dramatically ex-
panding the scope of the FAA, and narrowing the defenses to en-
forcement of arbitral awards. 
In each of these two cases, the Court’s decision limited access of 
parties to the courts.  In Hall Street, by refusing to permit parties to 
agree to expanded judicial review, and by excluding “manifest disre-
gard of the law” as a ground for judicial review, the Court eliminated 
court access that could provide a possible safety net for parties in the 
form of judicial review of the legal basis of an award.
188
  In Mitsubishi, 
by expanding the coverage of the FAA to statutory claims, the Court 
denied access to courts for parties, including parties to adhesion con-
tracts, whose claims might arise under statutes intended by Congress 
to protect parties’ rights through litigation.189 
Neither of the Court’s decisions is supported by the FAA’s text, 
on which the Court, in both cases, claimed to rely.  Moreover, the 
combination of the two decisions produced a very poor result.  It is 
noteworthy that the Court in Mitsubishi gave lip service to the need to 
review arbitrators’ decisions in this area.  It suggested that if U.S. anti-
trust laws were not properly applied by a tribunal sitting in Japan, the 
Court would be able to take a “second look” at the enforcement 
stage, and potentially vacate an improper award under a public policy 
exception.
190
  The Court has not, however, taken a “second look” at 
awards based on statutory claims.
191
  And yet, as will be discussed be-
 
 188 See supra Part II.B. 
 189 See supra Part III.B.1–2. 
 190 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, 
the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-
enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws has been addressed.”).  The Court has also asserted that “although 
judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient 
to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.”  Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); see also Philip J. 
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International 
Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1999). 
 191 See, e.g., Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International 
Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 52 
(2002) (“It has been well-documented that courts have yet to engage in the second 
look analysis that Mitsubishi contemplated.”);  McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 457 
(“The Court’s ‘second look’ has not yet occurred.”); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival 
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low, the expansion of arbitration to cover statutory claims creates a 
greater, not a lesser need, for meaningful judicial review.  Rather 
than waiting for the Court to take a second look, it is time for Con-
gress to take a close look at U.S. arbitration law, which no longer re-
sembles the FAA enacted in 1925, but rather has been transmogrified 
into an altogether different law enacted by the Supreme Court. 
IV. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTORY CLAIMS 
A. The Difference in Contract Claims and Statutory Claims 
Contract claims differ substantially from statutory claims. When 
an arbitrator is interpreting a contract, she is largely trying to deter-
mine what the parties intended, how they expected the contract to 
apply to the facts and circumstances that have occurred, what rights 
and obligations they allocated to each other, or how they would have 
allocated them if they had foreseen the events that actually occurred.  
These tend to be the kinds of issues that the parties, if they had been 
more careful or insightful or better able to anticipate future events, 
could have themselves negotiated in the contract.  The arbitrator 
thus tends to function in this situation as a kind of agent—a private 
party that other private parties have asked to decide issues that were 
within their power to decide.
192
 
Claims under statutes raise quite different issues, because they 
do not deal simply with agreements between private parties.  Instead, 
the Supreme Court’s declaration that statutory claims are arbitrable 
was a major delegation of judicial power to private citizen-arbitrators, 
who have no accountability to the public.  The arbitrator is no longer 
simply an agent for the parties, deciding issues that they could have 
negotiated themselves.  Instead, he is implementing public law that 
 
of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 367 n.154 (2007) (“[T]he 
Second Look Doctrine has proven to be largely an empty threat.”). 
 192 See Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 88, 113–14. 
[T]he rationale for limiting vacatur of arbitration awards to grounds 
that correspond to the grounds for denying enforcement to contracts 
generally is that the arbitrator, as the parties’ agent, is resolving ques-
tions that the parties could have resolved themselves when they drafted 
the contract. That rationale does not apply when the arbitrator is re-
solving issues the parties could not have resolved themselves when they 
drafted the contract. Those are issues about violations of rights con-
ferred by mandatory rules. . . .  
     . . . [W]hen arbitrators hear claims arising out of mandatory rules, 
courts should review de novo the arbitrators’ legal rulings on such 
claims. 
Id. 
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has the power to impact not only the immediate parties but also the 
public interest and the decisions of Congress as to policies that best 
serve the public interest. 
 Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitsubishi to permit ar-
bitration of statutory claims created a major paradigm shift.  Delegat-
ing the judiciary’s power to enforce a statute to arbitrators who have 
no real accountability to reach a decision in accordance with the law 
is a huge step to take in the absence of congressional input.  Further, 
this step has a real impact on the enforcement of the law.  As Justice 
Stevens has noted, an arbitrator “has no institutional obligation to 
enforce federal legislative policy.”193  An arbitral tribunal will most 
likely view its obligations to the parties before it, not to the public in-
terest.
194
  As a result, when arbitrators are deciding claims under pub-
lic law, there is a high potential for negative externalities.  For exam-
ple, if an arbitrator makes a wrong decision in a matter arising under 
the antitrust laws, that decision may negatively affect not only the 
claimants but the rights of everyone else affected by the anti-
competitive behavior.  As the Second Circuit noted in Am. Safety 
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., “Antitrust violations can affect 
hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of people and inflict 
staggering economic damage.”195  Yet in arbitration, the public inter-
est in how such laws are enforced may be detrimentally affected with 
no possible recourse. 
Enforcement of other statutory claims raise similar concerns.  In 
1981, Chief Justice Burger in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 
 
 193 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 649 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 194 McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 515 n.243.   
I wish to emphasize my belief that even exacting judicial review of 
mandatory law arbitral awards is woefully inadequate for the public 
judicial resolution of such claims.  In my view, the substitution of pri-
vate, privately paid arbitrators for a public judge, particularly for a U.S. 
district court judge, is so profound a deprivation of the intended en-
forcement schemes of most mandatory laws that even exacting arbitral 
adherence to public court rules of evidence and procedure is not likely 
to yield “correct” mandatory law results as consistently as public court 
adjudication.  Private arbitrators, no matter how skilled, are appointed 
to serve the interests and expectations of the parties to the arbitration, 
not the public; arbitrators’ interest in the legally correct resolution of 
mandatory law claims pales in comparison to their interest in resolving 
disputes in ways that serve their perceptions of the interests of the pri-
vate parties before them. 
Id. 
 195 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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Inc. discussing the possibility that employers might contract to arbi-
trate civil rights claims, said: 
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives 
behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title 
VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to 
contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts.  For 
federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same 
combination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious dis-




Nonetheless, today the Supreme Court’s paradigm shift regard-
ing statutory claims permits courts to do exactly what Justice Burger 
found objectionable: enforce arbitration agreements between em-
ployers and employees requiring arbitration of claims based on civil 
rights statutes.  Congress should seriously question whether civil 
rights claims can be adequately protected when plaintiffs are denied 
access to the court. 
 Resolving statutory claims based on mandatory law outside of 
the court system also means that there is no judicial review on the 
merits to ensure that the law is properly applied.  Moreover, the con-
fidentiality of arbitral proceedings and the lack of any precedent 
created by awards not only prevent development of the law, but also 
will not clarify what the law requires or deter potential violators. 
In addition, arbitration does not provide the same level of pro-
tection as the courts do because of the limitations on discovery.
197
  
The purpose of many of the laws that Congress has passed in the 
areas of antitrust, civil rights, consumer protection, and securities was 
to protect the weaker party.
198
  Unlike cases between two merchants of 
 
 196 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  In Barrentine, the Court 
held that employees could pursue their wage claims in federal court under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and were not barred by arbitration under a collective 
bargaining agreement.  Id. at 745 (majority opinion).  Chief Justice Burger agreed 
that civil rights claims should have a judicial forum, but dissented as to FLSA claims.  
Id. at 750 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 197 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 648 n.14 (Stevens, J. dissenting); Carrington & Haa-
gen, supra note 1, at 348 (“[I]t cannot be doubted that the availability of discovery 
assures that courts are in general more effective than arbitral tribunals in detecting 
wrongdoing and enforcing the rights of victims, whether of securities fraud, price-
fixing conspiracies, race or gender discrimination, or environmental misdeeds.”). 
 198 See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 332–33 (“[T]he Court has enforced 
arbitration clauses that were until recently deemed invalid impairments of rights 
conferred by Congress in its regulation of commerce, thereby weakening enforce-
ment of the national law. . . .  Those who have been prejudiced by the Court’s han-
diwork include many American consumers, patients, workers, investors, shopkeepers, 
shippers, and passengers.”). 
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approximately equal bargaining power, in cases where bargaining 
power is unequal, the stronger party generally controls most of the 
documentation necessary to prove a violation.  Because discovery is 
much more limited in arbitration than in litigation, a party making a 
complex statutory claim is likely to have greater difficulty proving its 
case in arbitration and therefore will be less able to vindicate the 
rights Congress intended the law to provide. 
Moreover, Hall Street and Mitsubishi make clear that even though 
arbitrators have been given the power to resolve complex statutory 
claims, there is no judicial review possible to ensure that they carry 
out the aims of the enacting Congress.  As noted above, the possibility 
of vacating an award on the basis of “manifest disregard of the law” 
appears to have been eliminated in Hall Street,199 and the Court has 
never actually taken the “second look” that it claimed in Mitsubishi 




 Alarm bells should be sounding in Congress.  The Court has 
delegated judicial power to private citizen-arbitrators to resolve dis-
putes arising under public laws crafted by Congress to protect indi-
vidual rights and promote fairness in commerce.  All of this has been 
done with no input from Congress.  It is time for Congress to focus 
on what is happening and to take back its legislative role. 
B. Congress Should Get into the Act 
The Supreme Court’s legislation on arbitration has occurred 
without the benefit of any comprehensive study of the field, collec-
tion and analysis of information, testimony at hearings, or any input 
of the kind generally made available to Congress when it is in the 
process of enacting important legislation.  Thus, the FAA has evolved 
as a legislative program without any systemic coherence.  The main 
factor motivating the Supreme Court appears to have been to remove 
as many disputes as possible from the courts.  In the process, arbitra-
tion has mushroomed as a dispute settlement device without ade-
quate attention to its overall impact within the system of justice, its 
potential abuses (including lack of actual consent) and its ability to 
undercut regulatory protections that Congress has included in sta-
tutes governing employment, civil rights, antitrust, securities, and 
consumer protection. 
 
 199 See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
 200 See supra note 191. 
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 Both the elimination of “manifest disregard of the law” as a 
separate ground for vacating an award that is based on an erroneous 
conclusion of law and the elimination of the possibility for parties to 
seek judicial review on the merits are at odds with the need to take a 
closer look at what private citizen-arbitrators are doing in terms of en-
forcing public laws.  A number of commentators have posited that 
arbitration of public or mandatory laws should be subject to a higher 
level of scrutiny.
201
  Professor Stephen Ware has stated  that “courts 
should review arbitrators’ legal rulings on claims arising out of man-
datory rules.”202  An arbitrator should not be free to misapply manda-
tory rules, and his awards should be reviewed to ensure correct appli-
cation of the law.
203
  Dean Philip J. McConnaughay has concluded 
that: 
[T]he Supreme Court should clearly differentiate between the 
scope of review appropriate for nonmandatory law arbitral awards 
and the scope of review appropriate for mandatory law arbitral 
awards, confining review of the former to traditionally restrictive 
notions of basic procedural fairness, but expanding review of the 
latter to require close arbitral conformance to American stan-
dards of procedure and demonstrably correct outcomes.
204
 
Commentators such as Professor Ware and Dean McConnaugh-
ay, as well as some members of the judiciary, see a distinct difference 
between arbitral awards based on contract, and awards based on 
 
 201 See, e.g., Ware, supra note 192; McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 457, 514–15, 
523. 
Unless U.S. courts are determined to abdicate completely their respon-
sibility for participating in the enforcement of mandatory U.S. law, 
they must undertake some review of international arbitral resolutions 
of claims arising under mandatory U.S. law, and their review must de-
part significantly from current standards that properly permit virtually 
no merits reviews of arbitral resolutions of nonmandatory law claims. 
 Id. at 514.  
 202 Ware, supra note 14, at 739.  While some arbitrations of contract claims involve 
interpreting statutes, such as provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. 
§ 1-102(3) (2004), most of those provisions are default provisions that the parties can 
contract around.  Thus, few mandatory provisions of law are involved.  In contrast, in 
employment discrimination claims, for example, the provisions of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are mandatory.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) 
 203 See Ware, supra note 192, at 114; see also Richard E. Speidel, Speidel’s Revised 
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 95, at 352, 374 (proposing to amend Chapter 2 of the FAA to 
provide, in part, “In an arbitration subject to the [N.Y.] Convention, a court may . . . 
deny recognition and enforcement on grounds of public policy if the award decides 
issues of mandatory law in the United States and that award contains clear errors of 
law or fact.”). 
 204 See McConnaughay, supra note 190, at 523. 
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mandatory rules that parties are not allowed to contract around. The 
mandatory law awards should not be left to stand on an erroneous 
conclusion of law.
205
  As U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Judge Diane Wood has noted, if “arbitration is to play a significant 
role in the enforcement of public law, then arbitration itself must be-
come more publicly accountable.”206  Such accountability “may re-
quire a careful expansion of the grounds on which ultimate awards 
can be reviewed in the courts.”207  There is obvious concern within the 
legal community that the Court’s delegation to private citizen-
arbitrators of broad power to decide questions of mandatory law with 
no possible review for error has had a deleterious effect on our legal 
system. 
Congress should give very thoughtful consideration to whether 
the delegation to arbitrators of the judicial power to decide claims 
under regulatory statutes may undermine the protections that Con-
gress intended to provide when it enacted specific statutes.  If Con-
gress determined that the intended protections are not adequately 
upheld through arbitration, it could reestablish what it intended 
when it originally enacted the FAA, i.e., that the FAA does not cover 
claims arising under statutes.  This would simply return arbitration to 




Alternatively, Congress could undertake a review of each class of 
statutes (i.e., securities, antitrust, employment, civil rights, consumer 
protection) in order to consider the purpose and the remedy in-
tended by Congress upon enactment.  Those statutes whose remedies 
do not seem appropriate for arbitration because the protections they 
provide are better suited to be enforced in a judicial proceeding than 
an arbitral one should be excluded from the coverage of the FAA. 
Congress could also determine that some claims, based on either 
statute or contract, might be reasonably arbitrated only if the deci-
sion to arbitrate was made postdispute, rather than predispute.  In 
fact, the thrust of several bills currently pending before Congress is to 
render unenforceable any predispute arbitration agreement in cer-
 
 205 See id. 
 206 Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 411 
(2003). 
 207 Id. 
 208 With the exception of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which 
found that a fraud claim should be arbitrated even though it was asserted under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, no statutory claims were found arbitrable by the 
Supreme Court until Mitsubishi in 1985.  
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tain classes of cases.  For example, the Fairness in Nursing Home Ar-
bitration Act provides that predispute arbitration agreements be-
tween a long-term care facility and a resident of that facility are not 
valid and not specifically enforceable.
209
  Similarly, the Consumer 
Fairness Act of 2009 prohibits predispute arbitration clauses in con-
sumer transactions or consumer contracts.
210
  The most significant bill 
before Congress on arbitration, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
would make unenforceable a “pre-dispute arbitration agreement . . . 
[that] requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, franchise, 
or civil rights dispute.”211 
Drafters of these bills want to eliminate predispute arbitrations 
in situations where there is very different economic power and 
asymmetric knowledge between the parties to the agreement.
212
  Post-
dispute arbitration is viewed as more acceptable because once the 
parties know and understand what issues are in dispute, if both par-
ties agree to arbitrate, the process is more likely to be based on actual 
consent, rather than imposed by the economically powerful party on 
the weaker party.
213
  In employment disputes, for example, if arbitra-
 
 209 H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. § 17(b) (2009).  The bill would amend Chapter I, Title 
9, United States Code (the basic FAA provision) by adding a new section 17, which 
would define a long-term care facility and prohibit predispute arbitration agree-
ments.  The Senate version of the bill, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009), contains very simi-
lar language, but would amend sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I of Title 9 to include this 
language, rather than adding it at the end in a new section. 
 210 H.R. 991, 111th Cong. § 1003(a) (2009). 
 211 S. 931, 111th Cong. § 402(a) (2009).  S. 931 differs in a number of ways from 
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009), which is similar to a prior bill that had been intro-
duced in the previous Congress, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).  The major changes 
in the new Senate bill are: first, that it provides for all of its changes to be in a new 
Chapter 4 of the FAA, S. 931 § 3(a); second, that it defines franchise dispute as in-
volving a franchisee having a principal place of business in the United States, id.; 
third, it appears to overturn the Supreme Court decision in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 
1229 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), by making clear that employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements requiring arbitration will still have the right to raise statutory 
rights in court; and finally, although the court (rather than the arbitrator) is allo-
cated the power to determine the validity and enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement, S. 931 § 3(a), this provision only applies to those agreements described 
in the new Chapter 4, and therefore is unlikely to have a major impact on interna-
tional arbitration agreements.  Id.  Criticism of the earlier version of the bill, which 
was the same as the current House version, included suggestions that allocation to 
the court of the determination of an arbitration agreement’s validity eliminated the 
widely accepted international doctrines of separability and competence-competence, 
and would therefore negatively affect international arbitrations.  See Edna Sussman, 
The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 455, 477–81 (2007). 
 212 See S. 931 § 2; H.R. 1020 § 2. 
 213 See S. 931 § 2; H.R. 1020 § 2. 
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tion were only possible if chosen postdispute, employers would have 
more incentive to ensure that the process were perceived as fair, so 
that parties would choose arbitration.
214
 
These bills, if adopted, would forestall some of the abuses of ar-
bitration, particularly when the stronger party imposes it on the 
weaker party without actual consent.  None of this legislation, howev-
er, would deal with the problem of the need for a higher level of 
scrutiny of arbitration decisions determining questions of mandatory 
law.  Even if all of the above referenced legislation were adopted, 
Congress should still confront the issue of judicial review of arbitral 
awards.  Congress could, after first considering whether arbitration of 
rights granted under a regulatory statute is appropriate, determine 
that certain rights could be reasonably well protected in arbitration 
and, therefore, that arbitration of claims arising under such statute 
should be allowed.  In such a case, it should then provide for appro-
priate judicial review of arbitral awards resolving claims under that 
statute.  This could be done simply by providing as an additional 
ground under the FAA that any claims arising under the particular 
statute or statutes can be reviewed on the merits.   
If such a framework were created, Congress should also consider 
whether it should be limited to domestic arbitrations.  While there 
are reasons judicial review on the merits might not be advisable with 
respect to international awards,
215
 such review should not cause a 
problem with respect to domestic awards.  Having judicial review on 
the merits for awards based on mandatory law would serve the pur-
poses of providing recourse for erroneous decisions, ensuring that 
the decision serves the public interest, and providing for the devel-
opment of the law by creating precedents.  It would help to keep 
these statutory protections from being undercut by private decision-
makers with no accountability to the government or to the public in-
terest. 
 
 214 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 3 (discussing flaws in mandatory pre-dispute ar-
bitration).  See generally David Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009) (responding to criticisms of the Arbitration Fairness Act). 
 215 Including mistake of law as an additional ground for review with respect to an 
international arbitration may cause enforcement problems in foreign jurisdictions.  
See Margaret L. Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of 
Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 456–65 (2004).  An award that was vacated on 
the basis of an erroneous conclusion of law might nonetheless be enforced in foreign 
jurisdictions.  Id.  Foreign jurisdictions may enforce a vacated award, unless it was va-
cated on narrow statutory or treaty-based grounds, which usually do not include mis-
take of law.  Id. 
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 Congress should also consider legislation to overturn the 
Court’s decision in Hall Street on the question of expanded judicial 
review.  If heightened judicial review were available for mandatory 
law claims, there would be less need for expanded judicial review be-
cause many claims would already be reviewable for mistakes of law.  
Nonetheless, there would still be arbitral awards based on contract 
claims not subject to heightened scrutiny, which some parties might 
wish to have reviewed by a court.  Because arbitration is founded on 
consent, parties who consent to arbitration should be allowed to 
choose to arbitrate on the condition that the arbitrator’s award be 
subject to court review.  Denying the choice means that parties with 
that concern will simply litigate, so that the court would have the en-
tire controversy before it rather than a mere review function.  Before 
Hall Street, even when certain courts of appeals were willing to provide 
expanded judicial review, few parties requested it.
216
  Thus, providing 
the choice to parties would not likely change the nature of arbitra-
tion, nor would it flood the courts with substantive challenges.  Most 
parties arbitrating contract issues would still opt for an arbitration 
process that would end with a final and binding award, unreviewable 
on the merits. 
As with claims under statutes, if Congress provided for review of 
legal errors whenever parties agreed to such review, there could be 
possible enforcement issues in some foreign courts,
217
 but the practice 
would not present problems of enforcement in the United States.  
Parties aware that they might need to enforce an award in a foreign 
jurisdiction would simply not agree to expanded judicial review.  
Permitting parties the choice of expanded judicial review would af-
firm party autonomy and the advantage that arbitration offers of 
permitting parties to tailor a dispute process to their particular needs.  
It would also provide comfort to certain nervous parties who would 
like to arbitrate disputes but are afraid to “bet the company” on the 
unreviewable decision of a private citizen-arbitrator. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Major changes have taken place in the administration of justice 
in the last few decades. The Supreme Court’s decision that private 
citizen-arbitrators can interpret and apply mandatory law, subject to 
no judicial review on the merits, undermines statutory protections 
created by Congress.  The Supreme Court has undertaken the devel-
 
 216 See supra note 32. 
 217 See Moses, supra note 215, at 456–65. 
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opment of the law of arbitration with disregard for the text and the 
legislative history of the FAA, such that it amounts to pure judicial 
legislation. This is not the proper role of the Supreme Court.  None-
theless, the Court has proceeded apace to lock in its legislative pro-
gram.  In its recent decision in Hall Street, it eliminated the possibility 
of judicial review of any mistakes of law by arbitrators, even where 
both parties agreed to it,
218
 and it did so at a time when it was increas-
ingly apparent that mandatory law should not be left to private citi-
zen-arbitrators who have no accountability to apply the law in a way 
that will uphold the protections enacted by Congress. 
It is time for Congress to reassert itself as the proper, constitu-
tionally empowered source of arbitration laws and policies, and to 
take steps to protect the legislation it has enacted. Arbitration loses 
credibility as a process to the extent that it becomes increasingly in-
consistent with the public’s perception of a fair means of resolving 
disputes and of ensuring that legislated protections under mandatory 
law are enforced.  By taking back the lead in determining the proper 
role and function of arbitration within our system of justice, Congress 
would go far toward preserving arbitration as a useful and workable 
means of resolving disputes.  For this to happen, however, there must 
be a sense that the process is fair, and that arbitral awards resolving  
statutory claims will not stand upon erroneous conclusions of law. 
 
 
 218 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403–05 (2008). 
